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I argue that Open Science as currently conceptualised and implemented does not take 
sufficient account of epistemic diversity within research. I use three case studies to exemplify 
how Open Science threatens to privilege some forms of inquiry over others, thus exasperating 
divides within and across systems of practice, and overlooking important sources and forms 
of epistemic diversity. Building on insights from pluralist philosophy, I then identify four 
aspects of diverse research practices that should serve as reference points for debates around 
Open Science: (1) specificity to local conditions, (2) entrenchment within repertoires, (3) 
permeability to newcomers and (4) demarcation strategies.   
 





“The empirical question is how belief, commitment, or theory 
and hypothesis acceptance are stabilised in the face of 
openness of inquiry. The normative question is how they are 
stabilised in a nonarbitrary way that has probative value” 
Longino 2002, 205 
 
Introduction 
The potential of Open Science (OS) to enhance research quality, integrity and societal 
impact has been widely discussed within academic and policy circles over the last two 
decades, and has been underscored by the rapid development of COVID-19 treatments and 
vaccines – an extraordinary scientific achievement which was arguably only possible through 
the immediate sharing of results around the globe. The effectiveness of disseminating results 
promptly, sometimes even before having them formally published – thereby speeding up 
research - has been extolled by scientific and popular media alike, most evidently in relation 
to the prompt dissemination of genetic sequencing data from various strains of the SARS-
COV-2 virus (an exemplary instance of ‘Open Data’) and the decision by publishing 
companies to temporarily release all coronavirus-related papers without charges (‘Open 
Access’).1 As the United Nations joins the choir of OS supporters with its 2021 
recommendation to implement OS worldwide, the OS movement looks well-positioned to 
determine the future of post-pandemic research and related policies. 
 
What this may mean on the ground is less clear, given the many competing views on 
what OS practices may involve (Fecher and Friesike 2014, Levin et al 2017). In what follows 
I focus on the vision of OS proposed by the European Commission in 2015, which defined it 
 
1 I examined these developments in Leonelli (2021) and Krige and Leonelli (2021).  
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as “a new approach to the scientific process based on cooperative work and new ways of 
diffusing knowledge by using digital technologies and new collaborative tools”. In this view, 
OS constitutes a positive development for the scientific landscape, whose implementation 
automatically improves the outputs of research as well as researchers’ working conditions. 
OS is presented as tightly linked to the digital transformation of research, and thus as a novel 
phenomenon that is dependent on the availability of information and communication 
technologies.2 OS is also presented as a global phenomenon focused on providing unlimited 
access to any research element, at any point of an investigation, to anybody with an interest 
in research, no matter where they are based and whether or not they are professional 
researchers. OS is thereby taken to facilitate equity and inclusivity in research production and 
consumption, by making previously inaccessible resources available to anybody interested in 
participating in research. An underpinning belief for this vision is that principles such as 
collaboration, transparency, reproducibility and openness are constitutive of good scientific 
practice, regardless of the specific conditions under which research takes place (Burgelman et 
al 2019). 
 
Despite vast efforts to implement OS thus defined, it remains unclear how this vision 
relates to the widespread diversity in epistemic practices and cultures characterising research, 
as richly documented by historians, sociologists and philosophers of science (e.g. Knorr-
Cetina 1999 and Kellert et al 2006). Most OS policies support the adoption of common 
metrics, standards and platforms, seen to facilitate communication among researchers and 
foster the effective sharing of data, models, software, ideas, materials, methods and whatever 
else happens to be produced in the course of an investigation (United Nations 2019). It is 
 
2 Note that the emphasis on the novelty of OS runs counter historical evidence of long-
standing collaborative and sharing practices within some scientific domains. (e.g. Strasser 
2020). 
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sometimes acknowledged that “one size does not fit all” (Open Science Policy Platform 
2018) and there are substantive efforts to develop “intelligent” approaches to openness and 
understand what OS involves within different research contexts (e.g. Boulton et al 2012 and 
long-standing work by the Research Data Alliance). Nevertheless, national and international 
policies tend to implement OS guidelines, tools and principles in a top-down manner and 
across domains, with some attention paid to disciplinary cultures but no fine-grained 
consideration of the diverse capacities, motivations and methods characterising different 
epistemic communities. 
 
By contrast, this paper argues that understanding the epistemic roles played by 
different forms of diversity within research, and particularly differences that go beyond the 
well-recognised and institutionalised boundaries between disciplines, is crucial to the 
implementation and the conceptualisation of Open Science - and that philosophy of science 
can contribute foundational insights towards developing such a framework. Building on 
consideration of three empirical examples, the first part of the paper illustrates how an overly 
standardised and generalised conceptualisation of OS and its implementation threatens to 
privilege some forms of inquiry over others, thus exasperating divides within and across 
systems of research practice. I highlight the complex interrelations among multiple sources of 
diversity of relevance to OS, and the difficulties in adequately addressing such interrelations 
through universal policy frameworks or appeals to disciplinary differences. Taking 
inspiration from philosophical literature on scientific pluralism, the second part of the paper 
proposes an alternative foundation for debates around Open Science, which focuses on the 
following characteristics of research: (1) specificity to local conditions and targets; (2) degree 
of entrenchment within existing repertoires; (3) degree of permeability to epistemically 
relevant newcomers; and (4) demarcation strategies to determine whether results can be 
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reliably regarded as scientific contributions, and who is involved in such decisions. I 
conclude that unless OS advocates embrace a more sophisticated understanding of epistemic 
diversity grounded on these insights, OS policies risk acting as a reactionary force reinforcing 
conservatism and inequity in research. 
 
Openness in scientific practice 
I start by briefly considering three scientific debates which exemplify both advantages 
and challenges of promoting openness across a wide range of research practices and 
locations. 
 
Case 1. Open versus equitable data access 
The first example concerns the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data 
(GISAID), a platform for transnational data sharing that rose to international prominence 
during the COVID pandemic. GISAID was launched in 2008 in order to share data of 
relevance to studying influenza and was swiftly modified in 2020 to include data on SARS-
COV-2. Contrary to other initiatives in molecular biology, which have long placed a 
premium on sharing of genetic sequences without any constraint (Maxson Jones et al 2018, 
Strasser 2020), GISAID requires anybody who wishes to access the database to sign a user 
agreement, which includes assurances about adequately acknowledging the original data 
producers. This requirement stems from the recognition that some researchers – often 
working in low-resourced environments and/or less visible research locations – are reluctant 
to share data due to fears of better-equipped researchers building on such work without due 
acknowledgment. Such fears are well-justified. Re-using data available online requires 
reliable and powerful connectivity and computing resources, as well as the adoption of 
standards typically built to match the theoretical perspectives of laboratories in the Global 
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North. Hence researchers based in low-resourced environments cannot easily take advantage 
of Open Data, no matter how innovative and rigorous their work may be, and remain 
reluctant to contribute their own data to online collections.  
 
GISAID was built with the recognition of entrenched differences in power, resources and 
visibility among research groups, and its data governance structure actively tries to counter 
postcolonial asymmetries between researchers based in the Global South and the Global 
North. Indeed, having a formal agreement and credit structure in place has proved remarkably 
effective at fostering trust and information exchange among groups that differ considerably in 
their geo-political locations, funding levels, material resources and social characteristics. And 
yet, despite this success and the many discoveries resulting from the opportunity to share data 
on virus strains across hundreds of research sites, GISAID has come under a barrage of 
attacks for “not being open enough” and posing “barriers that restarain effective data 
sharing”, particularly by researchers and institutions based in the Global North.3  
 
The debate over GISAID and its governance structure exemplifies how efforts to 
abide by the principle of openness, particularly when it comes to Open Data, can clash with 
responsible research measures geared towards protecting researchers whose work is 
unrecognised and/or discriminated against. In this as in many other cases, providing 
trustworthy and explicitly non-exploitative conditions for data sharing helps to widen 
participation in data sharing, which in turn expands the evidence base for subsequent 
discoveries. It also helps prevent the circulation of low-quality data (Leonelli 2018a), the 
expansion of digital divides (Bezuidenhout et al 2017) and socially harmful research (Elliott 
and Resnik 2019). In choosing to sidestep these issues, researchers calling for “fully open” 
 
3 See Open Letter (2021), which was subsequently reported in Nature. 
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data are discounting the significance of socio-cultural factors (such as the geo-political 
location and characteristics of researchers), institutional issues (such as power dynamics 
among research sites, expectations around intellectual property) and infrastructural resources 
(such as the availability of funding and dependable connectivity) to data re-use. 
Paradoxically, this may result in excluding some researchers from data sharing initiatives, 
which reduces the diversity and range of data available online, thereby constraining the 
evidence base for evaluating existing knowledge claims and developing new ones.  
 
Case 2: Free versus proprietary research software 
Already in 2011, Harding noted that “gone are the days when it could appear 
uncontroversial to assume that Western sciences are or have ever been autonomous from 
society, value-free and maximally objective, or that their standard for rationality is 
universally valid” (2011, x). This diagnosis rings ever truer given the rise of China and India 
as scientific superpowers and the ever-growing scientific workforce in many other non-
Western countries. And yet, regimes of assessment, credit and quality control set up by rich 
Western institutions continue to rule academic rankings and evaluation regimes. It should 
thus come as no surprise that the understanding and implementation of OS is largely 
grounded on ideas forged within privileged research locations in the Global North. Another 
case in point concerns the extent to which research work is assumed to depend on access to 
specific technologies, and the repercussions that such assumptions have on research 
evaluation.  
 
As an example, consider the importance assigned by OS to open source research 
software, which can be accessed and modified freely, thus posing no barriers to its adoption – 
contrary to the expensive subscriptions required by proprietary software. This requirement 
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may seem uncontroversial until one looks at how researchers in low-resourced environments 
select and use software to support their work. Indeed, the Global Young Academy carried out 
a survey among researchers in Bangladesh and Tanzania, which demonstrated a strong 
preference for using expensive proprietary software (Vermeir et al 2018). This was confirmed 
even in cases where equivalent open source alternatives were available and obtaining funds to 
pay for proprietary tools was difficult if not impossible. The reason for this preference was 
the perceived stigma attached to using open software. Participants in the study claimed that 
using open software was perceived by editors and referees of international journals as a mark 
of low-quality research, particularly when coming from research locations with little 
international reputation. Using well-recognised proprietary software such as MatLab and 
Mathematica, by contrast, was seen to align with international expectations around 
appropriate methodology, thus facilitating publication of research results by Anglo-American 
journals. Similar arguments have been made around quality assessment for datasets, which is 
often seen to depend on the technology used to produce the data – with the latest models of 
genome sequencers, for instance, taken to generate better data than earlier, cheaper models 
(Leonelli 2018a).  
 
When taking such findings into account, OS tools only look effective within specific 
types of well-resourced research environment, to the exclusion of others. The preference for 
specific technologies turns out to depend on factors other than the suitability of that tool to 
the scientific tasks at hand. Such factors may be infrastructural, such as the availability (or 
lack thereof) of appropriate training and support for adopting a given technology; 
institutional, including the structure of scientific publishing and the powerful role played by 
referees and editors; and socio-cultural, like the reputational hierarchies characterizing each 
field and the assumption that rich labs should act as role models for other research sites. 
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Notably, these factors affect the type of research being conducted, with researchers refusing 
to explore potentially useful tools due to the perceived stigma attached to their use. They also 
inform collaborative strategies, as researchers who do not have access to resources perceived 
as essential for international publishing often choose to partner with richer institutions who 
may provide such access. While open source software is recognized as valuable in theory, its 
use in practice clashes with existing - and sometimes conflicting - assumptions about what 
counts as reliable science, and who gets to decide.  
 
Case 3. Reproducibility in action 
To further underscore the methodological and conceptual implications of researchers’ 
adoption (or lack thereof) of OS practices, and the key role played by social and 
infrastructural factors in shaping that process, I now briefly consider the raging debate around 
the principle of reproducibility. Reproducibility, understood as the ability to replicate a given 
piece of research in ways that yield consistent results thereby corroborating their validity, is 
often presented as a pillar of OS, whose key function is to help decide which research results 
are credible and which are not (Burgerman et al 2019). Reproducibility thus acts as a 
criterion to distinguish science from pseudoscience, with non-compliant research being 
viewed as unreliable at best and arbitrary at worst. Highly controlled and standardised 
experiments with pre-specified goals, such as randomised clinical trials or gene knockout 
experiments on model organisms, constitute well-recognised instances of reproducible 
research and are held up as a model for good research practice more generally. Notably, the 
data produced through such controlled settings are also among the easiest to share and re-use, 
given that they are often obtained in digital form and accompanied by consistent metadata 
(Leonelli 2018a). Where does this leave research settings where controls and standards are 
 10 
not as well-developed, and where in fact the nature of the phenomena being studied demands 
few if any such controls and standards?  
 
Philosophers have noted how reproducibility takes different forms and meanings 
depending on the specific cluster of methods, settings, data types, targets, conceptual 
assumptions and goals that turns out to be of relevance to each scientific project (Radder 
1996, Guttinger 2020). Even within the same discipline, there can be dramatic differences in 
the significance ascribed to replicating a computer simulation, where control over research 
settings is so high, given their artificial nature, that both procedures and results are expected 
to be fully reproducible; field-based observations, where there is little control over research 
settings, and what is reproduced are observational skills rather than the results themselves; or 
data obtained by exploratory experiments where conditions vary during and across 
experiments, generating variations that are often the starting point for new investigations 
(Leonelli 2018b, Feest 2019). Taking highly controlled experiments as models for best 
practice in reproducible research, against which other forms of research are evaluated and 
results are demarcated as more or less credible, can therefore be damaging. Just like attempts 
to enforce openness regardless of the context, efforts to support reproducibility as 
demarcation strategy across all scientific domains side-step the variability in the methods 
developed to suit specific goals, concepts and target objects – as well the broader conditions 
for research work.  
 
Sources of epistemic diversity  
Even in this simplified form, these examples point to the variety of elements involved 
in the implementation of OS principles and tools, and the different ways in which such 
elements can be clustered and aligned within specific situations of scientific inquiry. Each 
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example presents some respects in which research situations may differ from each other, 
which are relevant to the implementation and conceptualisation of OS, and which I listed in 




Table 1. Sources of epistemic diversity of relevance to Open Science, classified under six 
umbrella categories: material, conceptual, methodological, infrastructural, socio-cultural 
and institutional.  
 
The relevance of these scientific components to knowledge production, and the 
variability among them, have been amply discussed by scholars of science including 
philosophers, historians and sociologists. There are two aspects that I wish to underscore 
here. One is the profound significance that different alignments of infrastructural, 
methodological, conceptual and institutional sources of diversity can have for the 
implementation and understanding of OS. This is worth emphasizing since some of these 
factors are not usually regarded by philosophers as having epistemic import, and it is 
sometimes assumed that conceptual or methodological issues can be considered and 
evaluated in isolation from social or material elements such as institutional settings and 
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infrastructure. And yet, the examples above highlight the crucial role played by 
infrastructural, institutional and socio-cultural factors in determining not only the conditions 
of possibility for research, but also the criteria used to evaluate its procedures and results. In 
that respect, the elements in table 1 function as sources of epistemic diversity, defined as the 
condition or fact of being different or varied, which affects the development and/or 
understanding of knowledge.4 
 
Another significant aspect is the capillary, highly situated nature of epistemic 
diversity, as evidenced by the local variation encountered even within the same disciplinary 
spaces. The use of disciplines to capture differences in methods and traditions does not 
capture the high variability displayed by research performed at different locations and with 
different perceptions of what constitutes best practice and who is responsible for adjudicating 
it. Most importantly, it does not capture the diverse ways in which researchers may pick and 
align specific elements to confront a given situation of inquiry. This is especially notable 
given the global increase in interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research efforts aiming to 
confront systemic challenges such as climate change, pandemics and population growth: 
within such multi-perspectival projects, understanding OS and its implementation involves a 
finer-grained analysis of differences among research groups than that offered by the broad 
categories of ‘discipline’, ‘domain’ or even ‘field’. To this aim, I shall use Chang’s idea of 
system of practice, which denotes any “coherent set of epistemic activities performed with a 
view to achieve certain aims” (2012, 16). 
  
 
4 This definition is an adaptation of the definition of diversity provided by the Cambridge 
English Dictionary.  
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Systems of practice: what matters for OS? 
Philosophical debates on scientific pluralism have provided a wealth of insights on 
what characterizes ‘the condition or fact of being different or varied’ among systems of 
practice and what makes such differences epistemically salient (‘affecting the development 
and/or understanding of knowledge’). I now discuss four such insights as particularly helpful 
to conceptualize and implement OS in ways that valorize, rather than undermine, epistemic 
diversity.  
 
First, as evident from Chang’s definition, systems of practice differ in their specificity 
to local conditions, targets and goals. At their best and following iterative refinement over 
time, research strategies and tools are exquisitely tailored to suit the specific characteristics of 
the phenomena under investigation: hence methods, theories and models differ depending on 
their suitability to target object(s) (Mitchell 2014) and the availability of materials 
exemplifying that target (Chapman and Wylie 2016). Moreover, research agendas and 
strategies are adaptive (Nersessian and McLeod 2013) and responsive to the inherent 
instability of targets (Feest 2017). Rather than assuming stable targets, generalizable 
approaches and standard methods to be desirable components of good research practice, OS 
thus needs to value the system-specific and dynamic features of local research settings and 
results.  
 
Over time, some systems of practice acquire a reputation for being more reliable, 
easier to mobilise and/or more productive than others (whether due to their effectiveness in 
achieving goals, the robustness of their methods, their suitability to existing policies and 
institutional settings, and/or other factors). Such systems of practice, including the relevant 
clustering of values, beliefs, institutions, methods and goals associated to the study of given 
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phenomena, thereby become entrenched as “gold standards” for research concerning those 
phenomena. In some cases, this results in a system of practice becoming institutionalised as a 
research field in and of itself. In others, systems of practice become what Ankeny and 
Leonelli (2016) call repertoires: ways of doing science that do not align with disciplinary 
boundaries, but retain a strong influence as blueprints that can be easily adopted and are 
implicitly recognised as effective and reliable. The use of randomised controlled trials, and 
related understandings of reproducibility, is a case in point; model organism research, and its 
associated ethos of data sharing as needing to be free of constraints and governance 
structures, is another (Ankeny and Leonelli 2020). 
 
In principle, good research can be construed as involving the freedom to consider 
which system of practice may be best suited to investigating given questions and targets 
(whether such a system already exists or needs to be developed). In practice, there are strong 
incentives to redeploy existing repertoires, not least because such mature systems of practice 
tend to have a standardised structure (including well-developed OS infrastructures) and 
require less work than the creation of a new system. The extent to which standards for 
making or evaluating research are embedded in a wider repertoire is highly relevant to OS. 
Indeed, the second insight I want to underscore is that systems of practice differ in the degree 
to which they are entrenched within existing repertoires, and thus the degree to which 
researchers are free to select and develop systems of practice that are specific to their target 
objects.   
 
The specificity and entrenchment of systems of practice, when considered together, 
present a problem for OS. The standardisation and redeployment of existing resources, 
including data and software, is a central aim for OS; but it is also a key avenue by which 
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systems of practice lose specificity and epistemic diversity. Indeed, researchers working with 
a system that is highly entrenched within existing repertoires may not value – or even 
consider – elements that are not already part of that repertoire. In other words, systems of 
practice differ in their permeability to epistemically relevant newcomers (whether these be 
ideas, methods, people, technologies or research sites), thereby challenging the appeal to 
openness and inclusivity that underpins OS policies.  
 
Pluralist philosophers have long pointed to the danger that excessive conservatism 
and exclusionary logics present to the robustness of knowledge claims. For instance, Longino 
highlighted the conditions under which results are publicly scrutinized as critical to the 
quality of that scrutiny: “not only must potentially dissenting voices not be discounted; they 
must be cultivated” (2002, 132). Exclusions based on social conventions embedded in 
specific institutions, such as the above-mentioned perception of open software as less likely 
to be favorably reviewed, are particularly damaging since they do not have a scientific 
rationale and yet they have powerful epistemic implications. OS practices need to explicitly 
and actively challenge the dominance of long-standing repertoires and encourage inclusivity, 
even where this complicates attempts to develop common standards and infrastructures.  
 
This brings me to my fourth and final point, which concerns the demarcation 
strategies used within any one system of practice to determine whether results can be reliably 
regarded as scientific contributions, and who should be involved in such decisions. Whether 
such demarcation strategies are implicit assumed or explicitly discussed, their development 
and adoption by researchers is arguably an unavoidable part of creating and maintaining a 
system of practice in the first place. By setting criteria for what constitutes proper science and 
what does not, and which forms of expertise are deemed to be relevant, demarcation 
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strategies provide the glue that brings and keeps epistemic activities together – what makes 
systems of practice coherent, in Chang’s terminology.5 This was famously recognised by 
both Popper and Kuhn, though Kuhn’s paradigms failed to capture the fine-grained nature of 
such decisions and Popper dismissed the normative relevance of factors other than conceptual 
and methodological. What this teaches OS is to exercise caution with indiscriminate appeals 
to general principles or procedures, and ensure that debates around OS implementation within 
any one system of practice include explicit and regular consideration of existing demarcation 
strategies.  
 
Conclusion: Ways forward for a pluralistic OS 
I argued that a key challenge for OS is to productively manage the clash between 
different interpretations and operationalisations of openness, which emerge from diverse 
systems of practice. Far from constituting an obstacle to the implementation of OS, 
consideration of epistemic diversity can help to realize the aspirations of the OS movement, 
while at the same time providing an opportunity for OS to avoid capture by dominant 
research repertoires and defy inequitable, conservative and flawed approaches to research.6 
Conceptually, this means moving away from defining OS through appeals to general 
principles and context-independent ideals of best practice, focusing instead on a procedural 
approach to OS as the ensemble of practices that facilitate critical scrutiny and re-use of 
research components and results, including of the demarcation criteria used by researchers to 
 
5 This raises an issue for Chang’s framing: while convergence on a problem agenda or set of 
goals is often an important component of demarcation strategies within a system of practice, 
it may not be a necessary requirement since other factors (e.g. agreement on specific methods 
of evaluation) can also ground demarcation strategies and ensure the coherence of epistemic 
activities. Discussing this issue falls outside the scope of this paper and I shall come back to 
it elsewhere. 
6 For a critique of OS as supporting conservatism, private interests and inequity, see 
Mirowski (2018).  
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adjudicate who constitutes a relevant beneficiary of and/or contributor (Levin and Leonelli 
2017). Methodologically, this involves improving researchers’ capacity to choose and 
develop systems of practice (and related demarcation strategies) that are well-suited to their 
targets and goals - which in turn requires transdisciplinary exchanges that help to identify 
appropriate and responsible manners of OS implementation, as well as provisions for 
research situations where digital tools are not immediately available or even relevant. 
Institutionally, OS needs to challenge existing systems for academic reward and publishing, 
and foster venues and tools to critically evaluate whether and how currently dominant 
repertoires serve existing and future epistemic goals. Last but not least, the transition to OS 
provides philosophers with an opportunity to further unpack the situatedness of knowledge 
production and ecological understandings of scientific reasoning long advocated by feminist 
epistemologists (Code 2006). The push to implement OS demands a systematic account of 
the implications of epistemic diversity in its various forms, as well as the role played by all 
components of research – including overlooked ones such as data, samples and software – 
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